
I wish there was a better word than lying for spreading false information. It's concise, charged, connected to the idea that the information being conveyed is false. But the scientific definition of "lie" isn't a false statement. We make false statements all the time, unintentionally. They're called mistakes.
The scientific definition of a "lie" is a statement intended to deceive. Intent is critical to this definition. If I tell you, "Bob's in the robot lab" because that's where I saw him last, but he's actually headed out to the barista, that isn't a lie, even though it's false: it's just a mistake.
But if I tell you "Bob's back at the office" - knowing full well that you're likely to look at his desk in the office, when he's actually taking a nap behind a closed conference room door across the hall, where you're unlikely to find him - then I've lied, even though the statement is true.
The problem is worse when we consider intellectual dishonesty. When someone puts forth a really terrible argument, are they actually being dishonest, or are they simply caught up in fallacious reasoning or even just honestly mistaken beliefs?
The truth is, people argue in bad faith all the time, and it's legitimately hard to tell - most humans are quite bad at spotting liars. Once an activist asked me to workshop a proposal he was making about a telescope built on native Hawai'ian land: he demanded ten percent of the budget go to native education.
"Isn't that reasonable?" he asked. "No," I said. "Imagine you're building a house. If you've budgeted a million bucks - half to land and half to construction, then if someone chops ten percent out of your budget, there goes your roof. No-one could agree to that even if they wanted to."
He tried various other unworkable permutations, until I finally asked, "Look, what do you want?" He thought, then said: "I want to put forth something so reasonable-sounding that no-one could oppose it, but which would be a poison pill for the telescope project. I want the telescope not to be built."
I declined to help him further. He was arguing in bad faith. To a casual observer, his proposals sounded like he genuinely wanted to help native Hawai'ian education, and was just naive about building construction: but behind that facade was a deliberate attempt to deceive.
It's hard to tell these apart. Politicians often lie, fooling mostly their own constituents; partisans assume their opponents lie by default. But the principle of charity demands that we assume the opposite: that others use ordinary words to make true statements with valid arguments about something interesting.
So, when positivist philosophers fail to extend this principle of charity to the tenets of religion, it's perhaps a stretch to accuse them of lying. I'm not even sure that they're actually being intellectually dishonest - but it is funny to encounter incoherent arguments from someone arguing that religion is incoherent.
I encountered this incoherence in an essay disparaging one of the key issues of the Great Schism that split the Roman Catholic Church from the Eastern Orthodox Churches: the doctrine of the Trinity, or, more specifically, how the Holy Spirit "proceeds": from the Father, or from the Father and the Son.
While this was enough to fracture churches back in the day, modern theologians think this "difference" to be mostly semantic, not doctrinal. But the author of the essay went further, claiming that it wasn't simply semantics - but that both positions had some unspecified fatal flaw which rendered them unintelligible.
But this 18 page essay on what's wrong with religious and philosophical thinking never gets around to actually telling you what, concretely, wrong with this kind of thinking. I'm not going to link the essay until I can read it again to be sure, but as you may have guessed, the problem is in the author's thinking.
The author mistook his disbelief in the premises for a flaw in the arguments. Since there is no logical flaw in these arguments - and I'll get back to that - they, as they said repeatedly in the article, found it difficult to put a finger on what's precisely wrong with this and other similar kinds of reasoning.
Well, I can help you out with that: the key mistakes philosophers make about religion is the allegation that religion consists of statements that are unprovable in principle, and therefore, because these statements are unprovable, they are therefore incoherent.
One professor put it like this: A man claims they met a man in a garden. You see no-one, so they claim the man's invisible. You listen, so they claim the man's inaudible. You excavate the garden and scan the dirt with X-rays, so they claim the man's intangible. At some point, you decide, the man just ain't there.
But that's not what happened at all. That's just the procession of bad judgments that follows from the bad arguments in David Hume's essay "Of Miracles", which we took apart earlier, perhaps unfairly, because Hume didn't have Bayesian or Jaynesian probabilistic reasoning at his disposal, but it's still wrong.
To be intellectually honest, we need to be up-front and open about the moves we're making. Religious people are not like a man claiming to have met an invisible man in a garden: they're like a man with a letter in his hand from that absent friend, reading it in the garden, waiting for them to come back.
You can claim that the letter is a forgery, or that the author is dead and is never coming back. Jaynesian probability theory tells us that if you entertain a variety of alternative hypotheses, you can get trapped in a state where you never accept an unlikely proposition, whether it is true or not. And that's fine.
That's your prerogative. But it's also a choice. And choosing not to believe the premises of an argument doesn't make the content or structure of the argument invalid. It just makes it not relevant to you. Like arguments over phlogiston or the luminiferous ether, they're simply no longer relevant.
Humans suck at understanding our judgments about logical arguments. We're strongly biased to think arguments are valid if we feel good about the conclusion, and invalid otherwise. If you've internalized Hume, and wrongly exclude the possibility of miracles, any argument about the spiritual feels wrong.
But choosing not to believe in the spiritual doesn't make it impossible. Jesus Christ did or did not come back from the dead; He was or was not the Son of God; He is or is not one Person of the divine Trinity, and did or did not inspire the information recorded about Him in the Bible.
If all that is true, why, then there may be any number of technical points which need to be worked out, and there's nothing incoherent about asking the question whether one aspect of this God we barely understand has this or that relationship to another aspect, which is equally difficult.
Similar debates go on right now in quantum mechanics, where extremely subtle issues about reality and measurement are debated every day, and while they look as abstract and as arcane as any arguments about angels dancing on the head of a pin, they can get cashed out into real experiments.
If there is a Judgment Day, discussions of the Trinity will get cashed out into real experiences as well. If not, they won't. If a philosopher, in their heart of hearts, just doesn't find the evidence for the Trinity convincing, I think he can be excused for gracefully bowing out of any of those discussions.
But calling those discussions incoherent is wrong, I think it's intellectually dishonest, and it sure feels like lying. I don't know that the people who hold that are actually lying, so I extend the principle of charity: and yet ... If you don't believe, just say you don't believe: don't argue your opponents are incoherent.
-the Centaur
Pictured: E. T. Jaynes, author of Probability Theory: The Logic of Science.
Quick sketch of John Watson. Kind of reminds me of a cross between H. P. Lovecraft and Clark Kent.
Drawing every day.
-the Centaur 
It's late and I'm tired and want to get to bed early, so here's a suuuper quick sketch of Xiao from f@nu fiku hanging out at a bridge of some kind. (She's up in the cables, goofing around over a vast drop, because she is insanely acrobatic and unafraid of heights, living as she does on a lighthouse cantilevered out over a sheer cliff face).
Drawing (well, sketching) every day.
-the Centaur 
What started to a quick sketch ended up with me pulling out all the stops so I didn't have to stay up to 4:30 in the morning. Roughed with a 2B pencil on Strathmore 9x12 Toned Tan, then inked with Sakura Micron pens, with shading and white highlights with Winsor-Newton Hard, Medium and White Charcoal plus a little 2B and final outlining with a Sakura Pigma brush pen. I like doing renderings on toned paper as you can go up to white and down to dark, giving you more ways to push the drawing. The face still is too wide, and is missing something, compared to the source image (
Douglas Hofstadter in Bologna, Italy - 06 March 2002[/caption]
Drawing every day.
-the Centaur 
Charles Darwin, roughed on tracing paper, then traced over the roughs, both with a Sakura Micron 1 pen on the theory it's late and I'm tired (and I'm more comfortable sketching with ink than pencil anyway).
The rough enabled me to get the guidelines of the shape in place, letting the drawing focus on the details. Still, I'm exaggerating eyes and especially noses. Sigh. More work to do ...
... drawing every day.
-the Centaur 
King James, a quick sketch roughed out with a 2B pencil and inked straight with a Sakura Micron 1 on the theory it's late and I'm tired. Face came out a little too tall, at least based on comparison with this detail of the original painting by John de Critz:
Drawing every day.
-the Centaur
Ayn Rand, roughed and inked in my usual fashion on Strathmore 9x12, No.2 pencil, Sakura Pigma and Micron pens, Sharpies for deep blacks. I squeezed the face proportions a bit, trying to get it right, and started dropping a few of my crutches on this (the heavy outlines). Again I did the trick where I turned it upside down to get the landscape right, particularly the triangle of eyes and nose; I even got the eyeline right, but failed to extend that courtesy to the mouth, which is bent a bit to the horizontal.
Nevertheless, I think, it came out pretty well: she looks so happy.
Drawing every day.
-the Centaur 
Hannibal Lecter, sketched on Strathmore 9x12 in #2 pencil followed by inking via Sakura Micron and Pigma pens. I think this one turned out pretty well, though the eyes are a tad less symmetrical than Sir Anthony Hopkins, eyebrows too far, and a few subtle details of the collar and mask aren't quite right.
C. S. Lewis, same medium as Lecter. His face came out a bit bloated, I think - probably, I rushed it since it was late. Nevertheless, spinning the picture 180 still helped how it came out quite a bit.
Drawing every day.
-the Centaur 
Blaise Pascal, roughed on Strathmore 9x12 with a 2B pencil (upside down to get the shapes right) and inked with Sakura Pigma and Micron pens. Forehead's a little off, slightly too big compared to the drawing; the left eye is not bent downward in the same way; actually, it seems like I squeezed that in a bit as I've been doing on some other drawings. In all fairness to myself, I actually increased the size of his head on purpose, as many older paintings seem to collapse the head a bit, and I didn't bend the left eye down, as I didn't see that distortion in any of the other paintings I could find of Pascal.
Drawing every day.
-the Centaur